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Abstract
The number and sophistication of commercial remote sensing satellites has grown steadily since 2000 when the first high-
resolution satellite went into service.  The nature and trajectory of the growth in satellite technology is outlined in this paper. 
The discussion is placed in the context of an international relations theory about statehood.  An area of limited statehood 
framework is outlined, especially as it relates to the maladroit use of force by limited states unable or unwilling to discipline 
security personnel or otherwise control the use of force.  Of course, another possibility is that the use of excessive and 
indiscriminant violence is deliberate.  We consider the “regulation of violence” to be deliberate violence by nonstate actors 
serving as “functional equivalents” for state oversight functions not found in limited statehood.  NGOs and other international 
institutions, comprising what Keck and Sikkink call a Transnational Activist Network (TAN), use remote sensing satellites to 
gather data about uses of force by weak-state security apparatuses.  Put more formally, we investigate the use of commercial, 
high-resolution remote sensing data by TANs as they attempt to regulate excessive and indiscriminate violence used by the 
security apparatuses of states that can be thought of as limited in key dimensions.
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First, remote sensing is no longer monopolized by 
powerful states, though many of the most powerful and 
capable satellites are owned and operated by corporations 
with close ties to the defense industries of major military 
and technological powers.  Despite these ties, a robust 
international commercial sector offers remote sensing 
products to nonstate actors and to other states that lack 
the resources needed to launch and operate surveillance 
satellites.  
Secondly, remote sensing data are multifaceted.  Commercial 
satellites offer information that goes well beyond pictures 
from space.  Data about precise spatial relations and 
coordinates are available, as are multispectral and hyper-
spectral data that register the material composition of 
objects on the ground. 
A third section of the paper offers a brief discussion of the 
political implications of these technological developments 
for a particular expression of limited statehood: the 
unaccountable and excessive use of force by weak state 
security forces.  I am interested in the use of commercial 
remote sensing in the “regulation of violence” by nonstate 
actors in the context of the Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink model of transnational advocacy.3  As they note, 
“The ability to generate and use information strategically 
is the main asset of transnational advocacy networks.”4 
Commercial remote sensing satellite technology has 
affected that ability, perhaps profoundly.  
3 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).
4 Margaret E.Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, Kindle edition 
2014), (Kindle Locations 3625-3627).
Introduction
  
It is difficult for some to recall a world without digital maps, 
satellite images, and nearly ubiquitous navigation devices. 
Yet when high-resolution remote sensing satellites were 
available to only the world’s most powerful and technically 
sophisticated states, access to precision satellite images was 
tightly controlled, and those who violated the restrictions 
were subject to severe penalties.  In 1985, for instance, 
Samuel Loring Morison, an American naval intelligence 
analyst, was convicted on two counts of espionage and two 
counts of theft of government property for leaking satellite 
images of a Soviet shipyard to Jane’s Defense Weekly, a 
respected defense analysis publication.1  Figure 1 shows 
one of the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite images leaked by 
Morison.
Figure 2 is the same shipyard as it appeared in an image 
taken by a European commercial satellite and used by 
Google in 2014.  One is now free to inspect what was 
Soviet Shipyard 444 (Nikolayev South Shipyard, Mykolaiv, 
Ukraine) using Google Earth.2  These two images illustrate 
the extraordinary changes in remote sensing that have 
occurred since 2000, the year the first high-resolution, 
commercially owned and operated satellite images became 
available. Images that were once shrouded in state secrecy 
are now available to anyone possessing a computer and 
internet connection, sometimes even at no cost.  This 
paper considers the implications of this development for 
governance in areas of limited statehood.
I begin with an overview of two key concepts: areas of 
limited statehood and digitally enabled collective action. 
The paper then reviews remote sensing and geographical 
information systems (GIS) technology.  Given the technical 
complexity of the topic and limited space, the goals of this 
paper must remain modest.  The aim is to offer an overview 
of major developments and outline some of the technical 
capabilities of various satellites.  Two key points emerge in 
this second section of the paper. 
1 Stephen Engelberg, Spy Photos’ Sale Leads to Arrest,” The New York Times, 
October 3, 1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/03/world/spy-photos-
sale-leads-to-arrest.html.
2 A higher resolution image is available with Google Earth, but for the purposes 
of comparison this less precise image was used.  It was found in less than five 
minutes of scanning the waterfront of the Port of Mykolaiv.  Using the toggles 
on Google Earth, one can move over a continuous image of the entire planet. 
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Figure 1
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Loring_Morison
Figure 2
Source: Google Earth Engine with “Mykolaiv” as the search term
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In its broadest terms this paper explores digitally enabled 
collective action in areas of limited statehood.5  An area of 
limited statehood is a place, policy arena, or period of time 
when the governance capacity of the state is unrealized or 
faltering.6  Governance can be defined as initiatives intended 
to provide public goods and to create and enforce binding 
rules.  International affairs literature also refers to steering 
and social coordination when speaking of governance. I 
treat governance as an analog to collective action, a term 
more common to political economics.    
Public goods include individual and collective security, 
economic welfare, education, public health, infrastructure, 
and a clean and safe environment.  Binding rules may come 
in the form of codified law that is enforced by formal state 
institutions (security forces and judiciary), or they may be 
norms and customs that are enforced by social pressure and 
informal organizations, such as community policing and 
traditional forms of arbitration and justice.7 
A state’s governance capacity may fall short in several ways. 
Where a state’s governance incapacity is coterminous with 
its sovereign borders, it can be said to be a failed state.  In 
2014, Central African Republic offered one example of total 
state failure.  Other examples would include states that have 
limited governance capacity in locations that are distant 
from central administrative resources, as in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. North and South Kivu in the DRC are 
too inaccessible for the state administrative apparatus in 
Kinshasa to have a meaningful impact.  Limited statehood 
is also evident in urban slums such as Makoko in Lagos, 
5 Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop, Bits and Atoms: Information and 
Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014)
6 Thomas Risse (ed.), Governance Without a State?: Politics and Policies in Areas 
of Limited Statehood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). p. 9.
7 Regarding enforcement of binding rules in limited state environments, see 
Steven Livingston, Africa’s Information Revolution: Implications for Crime, 
Policing, and Citizen Security, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, (NDU 
Press, 2013).  For an example of criminal adjudication in limited state 
environments, see Max Rettig, “Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 
in Post-conflict Rwanda?,” African Studies Review, Volume 51, Number 
3, December 2008, pp. 25-50; Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution, 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).
Nigeria or Mathare in Nairobi, Kenya. These are places 
devoid of state provisioning of roads, sanitation, security, 
and most other public goods, despite their proximity to 
central administrative resources.  Yet in both cases, the 
state cannot—or will not—provide public goods or enforce 
binding rules with legitimate force.  
Limited statehood may also apply to a particular policy 
arena.  In this case, the state fails to provide a particular 
public good, such as adequate healthcare or effective 
and accountable security.  This condition may apply to 
a particular location, such as an urban slum or distant 
region, or it may be coterminous with state borders. 
Limited statehood may also be sociologically based, as is 
the case when an otherwise consolidated state fails (again, 
sometimes by design) to provide public goods to persons 
according to their race, gender, or religion, to name a few 
of the common bases for discrimination.  Apartheid South 
Africa offers an example of such a state.  The governance 
capacity of a consolidated state such as this is oriented 
toward the control of a disaffected and disenfranchised 
segment of the population.  Security comes to be defined as 
securing one part of the population from demands made by 
another marginalized segment of the population.  Finally, 
state governance capacity may be disrupted, such as when 
a natural disaster degrades the governance capacity of a 
state in the affected region.  The scope of the diminished 
governance capacity of the state and its duration is 
contingent on its capacity prior to the catastrophe. 
In general, rather than a dichotomous variable, as 
references to failed (or not) states imply, state governance 
capacity is more accurately conceptualized as running 
along a continuum: from failed states at one end to fully 
consolidated states at the other.  It is also multifaceted, 
evident in geographical pockets of territory or contingently 
absent according to sociological considerations or 
temporary exigencies.  This makes meaningful metrics of 
state governance capacity highly problematic. What might 
appear to be a fully consolidated state according to gross 
indicators might in fact be a quite limited state according 
to sectorial, social, or even spatial grounds.  Indeed, it is 
Digitally Enabled Collective Action in Areas of Limited 
Statehood
Page 8
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SATELLITES AND THE REGULATION OF VIOLENCE IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD
intuitively clear that limited statehood of one sort or another 
is quite common. This is true even of the Global North, 
where large urban slums constitute, at least to a degree, an 
area of limited statehood.  According to Thomas Risse, as 
much as 80 percent of the world’s population is affected, in 
one way or another, by an area of limited statehood.8 
Thinking in terms of areas of limited statehood also 
disentangles governance from government (or the state). 
This is especially important to the discussion of remote 
sensing satellites and their role in mitigating some of 
the harsher effects of limited statehood.  While states are 
limited in the ways previously described, it does not, 
perforce, follow that governance is altogether missing. 
Governance might instead come from alternative sources. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international 
NGOs (INGOs), civil society organizations, clans, and 
even gangs may serve, in varying places, moments, and to 
varying degrees of effectiveness, as alternative governance 
modalities.  Most often, governance is provided by a mix 
of modalities, such as public/private partnerships for public 
service provisioning in mostly consolidated states, or INGO, 
NGO, and international lending agency collaboration in 
healthcare in areas with little or no state capacity.9  
Multimodal governance is particularly important when 
considering the role of technology as a sort of governance 
force multiplier.  Leveraging technology lowers the 
organizational burden historically associated with the 
provisioning of public goods.10  By lowering communication 
and collaboration costs, information and communication 
technology facilitates organizing without formal 
8 Thomas Risse 2011, p. 6.
9 Marianne Beisheim, Transnational Partnerships: Effectively Providing for 
Sustainable Development?, Collaborative Research Center (SFB-700)- 
Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/
publikationen/palgrave/Beisheim_Liese_Transnational-Partnerships_2014/
index.html; Thomas Risse, Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited 
Statehood: Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources, Working Paper 32, 
Collaborative Research Center (SFB-700)- Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood. http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/working_
papers/wp32/index.html. See also Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid System, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 9–14.
10 Arthur Lupia and Gisela Sin, “Which Public Goods are Endangered?: 
How Evolving Communication Technologies Affect The Logic of 
Collective Action,” Public Choice, 2003, 117, pp. 315-331; Bruce Bimber, 
Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of 
Political Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jennifer 
Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in 
the Internet Era, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); W. Lance Bennett 
and Alexandra Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and 
the Personalization of Contentious Politics, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013).
organizations, such as states.  Hierarchically organized 
bureaucratic structures are, in essence, communication 
devices, facilitating flows of information and decisions 
up and down a command and control organizational 
structure.  The state is the ultimate expression of this 
particular governance morphology.  Recent scholarship has 
considered the role of digital technology in the provisioning 
of public goods, even in the absence of formal hierarchical 
state institutions.  Community groups, NGOs, INGOs, 
and states facing shortages in administrative resources can 
leverage mobile telephony, digital maps, and text-messaging 
aggregating systems such as FrontlineSMS to strive for goals 
that would otherwise be unattainable.11  The main benefit 
derived from the proliferation of these technologies is the 
reduced communication and collaboration costs associated 
with networked information environments.  Rather than 
building organizations to achieve a public good, digital 
technologies are used to organize collective actions 
intended to provide a public good, even in the absence of 
the state.  It involves a shift from a noun (organizations) to 
a verb (organizing).  
This study focuses on a second possible effect on governance 
associated with the proliferation of digital technology. 
Whereas digitally enabled collective action centers on 
the use of digital technology in the provisioning of public 
goods in areas of limited statehood, this paper concerns itself 
with the use of digital technology in attempts to strengthen 
accountability for the maladroit and indiscreet transgressions 
of broadly recognized international norms.  Stated more 
precisely, this paper seeks to understand how remote 
sensing might strengthen efforts to hold those responsible 
for egregious acts of violence against civilian populations to 
greater account. 
Several examples of technologically enabled surveillance 
of abuses illustrate this point.  Mobile phone cameras are 
now nearly ubiquitous.  Among other outcomes, their 
proliferation has led to a greater awareness of police 
misconduct.12  In 2014, when the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) asked citizens to tweet pictures 
of positive encounters with the NYPD it was instead 
inundated by pictures of police violence directed against 
11 Sharath Srinivasan, “FrontlineSMS, Mobile-for-Development and the ‘long 
tail’ of governance,” in Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop (eds.), Bits 
and Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited 
Statehood, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
12 Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police 
Brutality, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
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citizens.13  In 2014, following several deadly confrontations 
with citizens across the United States, there were broad 
calls for police departments to adopt the use of cameras 
as standard equipment for every police officer.14  In these 
cases, relatively responsive state institutions took steps to 
correct maladroit policing practices.  
Crowdsourced election monitoring also relies on ubiquitous 
mobile phones and digital maps.15 Intuitively, greater public 
confidence in the integrity of an election diminishes the 
likelihood of the sort of post-election violence seen in 
Kenya in December 2007 and January 2008.  Crowdsourced 
mapping–or crisis mapping–is now used around the 
world.16
Another example of digitally enabled transparency is 
found in DNA matching.  Like so many aspects of modern 
life, advances in genetics have come hard on the heels of 
advances in computer processing power and speed.17 
Forensic anthropologists have taken advantage of the lower 
costs and increased speed of genetic analysis to match the 
DNA of victims of massacres with surviving members of an 
affected community.18  From these data criminal cases are 
built against the perpetrators of the violence.19
We are interested here in exploring the connection 
between digital technologies and abuses by security forces 
in places where the state is less responsive, either because 
13 David Goodman, “Lesson for the Police: Be Careful What You Tweet For: 
New York Police Reach Out on Twitter but Receive a Slap in the Face,” The 
New York Times, April 22, 2014.  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/
nyregion/new-york-police-reach-out-on-twitter-but-receive-a-slap-in-the-
face.html.
14 Tony Farrar and Barak Ariel, “Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially-
Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras 
on Police Use-of-Force,” Police Foundation.  http://www.policefoundation.
org/content/body-worn-camera.
15 Patrick Meier, Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is Changing the Face of 
Humanitarian Response, (New York: Taylor and Francis Press, forthcoming); 
Catie Bailard and Steven Livingston, “Crowdsourcing Accountability 
in a Nigerian Election, Journal of Information Technology and Politics,” 
forthcoming.
16 Catie Bailard, Rob Baker, Matt Hindman, Steven Livingston and Patrick 
Meier, Mapping the Maps: A Meta-Level Analysis of Crowdsourced Data, 
A Report of the Internews Center for Innovation & Learning May 2012, 
Washington DC. http://crowdglobe.net/report
17 Ed Uberbacher, “Computing the Gnome,” Oak Ridge National Laboratories.” 
rhttp://web.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v30n3-4/genome.htm.
18 Sarah Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for 
Srebrenica’s Missing, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); 
From Guatemalan Soil, Scientists Unearth Signs of Genocide,” PBS Newshour, 
May 8 2013. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science-jan-june13-
guatemala_05-08/.
19 Pamela Yates, “Granito: How to Nail a Dictator,”
of administrative incapacity, indifference, or deliberate 
practice.  Inquiries are limited to remote sensing satellite 
images and geospatial data and their use by transnational 
advocacy networks.  This narrowed focus excludes other 
research questions relating to digital technologies and 
governance, along with some questions relating to remote 
sensing alone and governance.  A complete list of these 
projects would itself constitute a separate paper.  
The balance of this study will consider the role of remote 
sensing and GIS in governance where the state is only 
partially consolidated.  Particular focus is given to cases in 
which the state has the administrative or logistical capacity 
to deploy force to most or all regions found within its 
sovereign borders, while lacking the capacity to impose 
discipline to prevent maladroit application of force against 
civilian populations, often in violation of broadly recognized 
international norms.20  An alternative circumstance is found 
when the capacity to impose discipline exists in the absence 
of will.  Indeed, indiscriminate violence is the goal, either for 
purposes of revenge or intimidation or other unfathomable 
reasons.  Applied in such cases, the use of force erodes the 
legitimacy of the state.  Max Weber’s definition of statehood 
is important to this framing of the question.  His definition 
of statehood involves the legitimate application of violence 
for the purpose of enforcing binding rules.  
(W)e have to say that a state is a human community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory…Specifically, at the present time, the right 
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions 
or to individuals only to the extent to which the state 
permits it. The state is considered the sole source of 
the ‘right’ to use violence.21
Poorly applied, the state’s use of force undermines 
legitimacy.  One of the examples offered below involves the 
use of remote sensing satellite imagery to uncover abuses 
by poorly trained and undisciplined Nigerian soldiers as 
20 For example, see Will Ross, Uganda army in ‘rights abuses’,” BBC, July 16, 
2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3071421.stm; Aufu Hirsch, “Mali’s 
Army Suspected of Abuses and Unlawful Killings as War Rages,” The 
Guardian, January 19, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jan/19/mali-army-suspected-abuses-killings; Daniel R. DePetris, “Nigerian 
Army Abuse Is Making It Difficult to #BringBackOurGirls,” The Huffington 
Post, May 16, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-r-depetris/is-
american-law-obstructi-nigeria_b_5324612.html
21 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” p.1. http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf.
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they confronted Boko Haram, the Islamist insurgency 
group.22  There is no question that Boko Haram is a security 
threat to the people of Nigeria.  Yet the Nigerian security 
forces are themselves a separate threat to individual and 
collective security.  How might remote sensing help address 
this condition?  The next section begins an answer to this 
question by way of a description of the evolution of remote 
sensing technology.  
22 “Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Death from Military Raid,” Human Rights 
Watch, May 1, 2013.  http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-
destruction-deaths-military-raid; Eric Schmitt and Brian Knowlton, “U.S. 
Officials Question Ability of Nigeria to Rescue Girls,” The New York Times, 
May 15, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/world/africa/nigerian-
military-schoolgirl-hunt.html?_r=0; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on African Affairs “#BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the 
Growing Threat of Boko Haram””Testimony of Alice Friend Principal 
Director for African Affairs. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Friend_Testimony.pdf.
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Reconnaissance satellites have been in use for over a 
half-century, starting with the launch of the American 
Corona reconnaissance satellite in 1959 and the Soviet 
Zenit satellite in July 1962.23  Several versions of the Zenit 
satellite continued to be launched as late as 1994.24  Other 
more recent Soviet/Russian satellites include the Resurs 
and Persona series, with the latter also known as Kvarts 
(Quartz).25  The next generation American satellite system 
was the KH-11 KENNAN, renamed CRYSTAL in 1982 and 
more recently dubbed the Evolved Enhanced CRYSTAL 
(EEC).26  The later versions of the satellite are also classified 
as KH-12, Advanced KENNAN, or Improved Crystal.  The 
original KENNAN was the first to employ Electro-optical 
sensors and a charge-coupled device, allowing the film 
capture system–involving the retrieval of a film canister–to 
be replaced by data transmissions to earth.  
Aside from the American and Russian government 
programs, starting in the 1980s the Chinese government 
developed film-return satellites, and in the 21st century 
launched several Yaogan Weixing reconnaissance satellites.27 
In Europe the Helios 2A (launched in 2004) and Helios 2B 
(launched in 2009) are military observation satellites used 
by France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece.28  These are among 
the principal state reconnaissance satellite systems.
Little is known about the hardware and capabilities of state 
operated satellites, though many have speculated that an 
American KH-11 is roughly the size of the Hubble Space 
Telescope (which is about the size of a city bus) and equipped 
23 Day, D.A., Logsdon, J.M., Latell, B., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy 
Satellites, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998). National 
Reconnaissance Office Corona Fact Sheet. http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/
corona/factsheet.html; V. Agapov, “Launches of Zenit – 2 Spacecraft,” Novosti 
Kosmonavtiki, Aerospace magazine of Videokosmos Company, Vol. 6, May 
6 – 19, 1996, pp 68 – 69.
24 Robert Christy, Zarya: Soviet, Russian and International Space Flights; 
Index of Vostok and Zenit Missions. http://www.zarya.info/Diaries/Zenit/
Zenitindex.php. 
25 Anatoly Zak, Russianspaceweb.com. http://www.russianspaceweb.com/
persona.html
26 Bill Yenne, The Encyclopedia of US Spacecraft, (New York: Exeter Books,1985), 
p.82.
27 Rui C. Barbosa, China Launch YaoGan Weixing-9, NASA Spaceflight.com, 
March 5, 2010. http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/03/china-yaogan-
weixing-9-increase-in-vehicle-production/ 
28 Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), Helios, http://www.cnes.fr/web/
CNES-en/2744-helios.php.
with a similar 2.4-meter reflective mirror producing a six-
inch spatial resolution.  This means the satellite is capable of 
distinguishing objects on the ground that are no larger than 
six inches in diameter, or so it is speculated.  
Some features of these powerful surveillance satellites 
are hard to keep secret.  The low-earth orbit and size of 
the government satellites make them fairly easy to spot, a 
fact that has created a hobby: satellite tracking.  Amateur 
satellite trackers around the world use telescopes and the 
Internet to collaboratively track the orbital path of various 
satellites.  On August 28, 2013, a Delta-IV rocket, the most 
powerful in the U.S. inventory, capable of putting a twenty-
five ton payload into low Earth orbit, was used to launch a 
National Reconnaissance Office satellite from Vandenberg 
Air Force Base in California.29    Amateur satellite trackers 
spotted the satellite on its very first orbit.  They were able 
to calculate its orbital parameters from information gleaned 
from observing the satellite as it arced across the sky.30 
From there, calculating an orbit of 252 by 996-Kilometer 
at an inclination of 97.88 degrees, hobbyists were able to 
deduce that it was, as originally suspected, a KH-11, and 
that its mission was to complete a specific constellation of 
surveillance satellites.31  Knowing the orbit of other KH-11s 
led to the determination of the purpose of NROL-65 within 
its first orbit.32  As evidenced, much can be deduced about 
a satellite by its launch, orbit, and relationship to other 
satellites in orbit. 
Yet other aspects of government satellites are not well 
known.  This includes the nature and capabilities of the 
sensors or cameras carried onboard.  That is not true, 
of course, for the commercial remote sensing industry. 
Before describing several civilian and quasi-civilian satellite 
systems it is appropriate to discuss some of the features 
and capabilities of the hardware onboard commercial 
satellites.  The principal objective of this section is to 
29 The launch can be viewed on YouTube.  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gL1dEBZ6Vyc
30 Visual Satellite Observer’s Home Page. http://www.satobs.org/satintro.html
31 NROL-65 spotted in Classified Orbit by Satellite Trackers around the World, 
August29, 2013.  Spaceflight101. http://www.spaceflight101.com/delta-iv-
heavy-nrol-65-launch-updates.html
32 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions. http://www.n2yo.com/
satellite/?s=39232
Remote Sensing Satellites
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illustrate capabilities without delving into an overburdened 
discussion of the inventory of satellites and sensors. 
Three important metrics are associated with remote 
sensing satellites: spatial resolution, spectral resolution, and 
temporal resolution.33  Spatial resolution refers to the detail 
that is discernible in an image or, put another way, the size 
of the smallest possible feature that can be detected in an 
image. Figure 3 offers three contrasting images of the same 
location.  Moving from left to right, one sees an example of a 
ten-meter resolution image, a thirty-meter resolution, and, 
finally, an eighty-meter resolution image.  The ten-meter 
resolution image obviously offers the greatest detail of the 
three images, yet it should be kept in mind that ten meter 
resolution imaging is not representative of the most capable 
high-resolution sensors.  As we will see in our review of 
several civilian or quasi-civilian satellite systems, most now 
offer sub-one-meter resolution images, with one offering 
thirty-one-centimeter (about 12 inches) images.  That 
means that from about 400 miles in space, high-resolution 
sensors can take pictures that are detailed enough to see 
objects on the ground that are about the size of a small 
microwave oven.  As a point of comparison, we noted above 
that a KH-11 satellite might have a spatial resolution as 
great as 6 inches.  
33 These are the three key metrics for assessing satellite capabilities used in this 
study.  Others metrics not discussed here would include onboard data storage 
capacity, geolocation accuracy, daily coverage total, swath width, and camera 
agility, including the ability to take stereo images on the same pass.  Stereo 
images (two or more images taken of the same spot but from different angles) 
offer the possibility of creating 3-dimensional extractions or models of the 
imaged location. These attributes are discussed at length on various online 
reviews.
A second metric is the spectral resolution of a sensor. 
This refers to the number of bands of the electromagnetic 
spectrum that a sensor is capable of detecting. 
Electromagnetic radiation can be described as a stream of 
photons moving at the speed of light in a wave-like pattern. 
Visible light falls between infrared and ultra violet and 
constitutes only a tiny fraction of energy.  Radio waves, 
microwaves, infrared waves, ultraviolet waves X-rays 
and gamma rays make up the rest of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  Spectral resolution is measured in terms of 
bands, though it is important to keep in mind that there are 
no truly fixed points of separation between bands.  High or 
hyper-spectral resolution involves 220 bands; medium or 
multi-spectral resolution collects data in 3 - 15 bands; and 
low spectral resolution collects data in 3 bands.  A single 
band image is generally displayed as shades of gray.
Spectroscopy or spectrography refers to the measurement of 
radiation intensity as a function of wavelength in relation to 
matter.  Put metaphorically, it can see differences in matter. 
Multispectral and hyper-spectral sensors and processing 
systems are used in astronomy, agriculture, biomedical 
imaging, mineralogy, physics, and surveillance.  Physical 
matter and gases leave unique ‘fingerprints’ according to 
Figure 3
Source: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing & Processing 
http://www.crisp.nus.edu.sg/~research/tutorial/image.htm
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the energy they emit in relation to the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  Known as spectral signatures, they allow 
scientists to identify the materials found in a scanned object. 
For example, fat, water, and protein contents in industrial 
scale meat batches are determined by near infrared (NIR) 
reflectance spectroscopy.34  Another example is that of 
spectral signatures, which help mineralogists find untapped 
oil deposits and enologists map grape varieties growing in 
a particular region.35  The health of a forest (determined by 
measuring photosynthesis), the chemical composition of 
smokestack plumes, or the material composition of waste 
products either in the water or on the ground is detectable 
from space.  In short, “seeing” involves much more data 
than is typically associated in popular imagination with 
satellite images. 
There are trade-offs between spatial resolution and spectral 
resolution.  High spatial resolution is associated with a low 
spectral resolution. The more detailed the spatial resolution, 
34 Liu, Y., Lyon, B.G., Windham, W.R., Realini, C.E., Dean, T., Pringle, D., 
Duckett, S., “Prediction of Color, Texture, and Sensory Characteristics of Beef 
Steaks by Visible and Near Infrared Reflectance Spectroscopy, Meat Science 
65 (2003) 1107–1115.
35 Freddie M. Lacar, Megan Mary Lewis, and Iain Thomas Grierson, “Use of 
Hyperspectral Imagery for Mapping Grape Varieties in the Barossa Valley, 
South Australia,” Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium (IGARSS’01) 
- IEEE 2001 International, vol.6 pp. 2875-2877.
the more likely the image will be panchromatic (gray-scale). 
This pattern in the satellite systems is summarized in Tables 
1 and 2. 
The final metric of interest to this paper is temporal 
resolution, which refers to the frequency of flyovers of the 
same location by a satellite or constellation of satellites. 
This is also commonly referred to as revisit frequency. 
Intelligence agencies -- and now NGOs and advocacy 
organizations -- use repeated coverage of the same location 
to reveal changes in infrastructure or naturally occurring 
features.36  Deforestation, receding glaciers, rising oceans, 
weapons facilities, troop deployments, construction sites, 
and soil disruption (where mass graves might be situated) 
are monitored over time from orbit.  
Yet images of whatever type and scale are not the most 
important product of remote sensing satellites.  The 
ability to scientifically measure physical space adds to the 
36 Sean Aday and Steven Livingston, “NGOs as Intelligence Agencies: The 
Empowerment of Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Media by 
Commercial Remote Sensing in the Case of Iranian the Nuclear Program,” 
Geoforum, 40 (2009) 514-522.
Figure 4
Source: http://www.cyberphysics.co.uk/topics/light/emspect.htm
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importance of remote sensing.  The geodetic location of a 
topographical feature on, in, or above the Earth is calculated 
according to its longitude, latitude, and its vertical distance 
from the center of the Earth.37  Determination of geodetic 
location is now assisted by the specification of every inch 
of the planet’s surface and the creation of technologies that 
allow for geospatial awareness, that is, the constant update 
of awareness of where in space anything is temporally 
situated.  
Geographical information systems (GIS) are software 
platforms used to manage and process geospatial data. 
With GIS and a handheld instrument able to interact with 
37 Lynn Carlson, “Understanding Geospatial Data Files used in Geographic 
Information System Software,” GIS Manager Environmental and Remote 
Technologies Lab Brown University. http://gisatbrown.typepad.com/gis/files/
spatialdatafiles.pdf
The Emergence of a Commercial Remote Sensing Sector
geographical positioning satellites (GPS), or other devices 
such as mobile phones that achieve a similar effect through 
triangulation with cell towers (that are themselves situated 
in precisely known coordinates), one can situate any object 
or phenomena in physical space on a digital map.  These 
are the technical attributes that make “smart bombs” smart, 
capable of striking targets thousands of miles away by 
following GPS signals in relation to a set of coordinates. 
The same attributes allow commuters to find a particular 
destination. Another important feature of GIS and remote 
sensing geospatial data is the ability to array data about 
events and phenomena in physical space.  By putting a pin 
on a digital map, usually referred to as dropping a waypoint, 
one can specify the location of an event or abstract 
phenomena.  Patterns and associations are revealed in the 
process. 
How has the commercial remote sensing industry emerged? 
Part of the story involves the evolution of Landsat.  Landsat 
was one of the first remote sensing satellite systems to 
transition from a state ownership and operation system 
to the private sector.  In 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
authorized the transfer of Landsat operations from NASA 
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association 
(NOAA).  Carter’s order also signaled the eventual 
privatization of Landsat.  This occurred six years later, when 
the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), a jointly 
owned company by RCA and Hughes Aircraft, assumed 
control of the operation.  At time of this writing, there have 
been eight Landsat satellites in all (one of which failed), and 
two operational Landsat satellites in orbit in 2014.  
Strict references to commercial or private satellites, as 
opposed to state-owned satellites, are difficult.  “Private” 
and “commercial” have different definitions in different 
nation-states. In Europe, references to commercial 
satellites connote the ability to generate revenue, regardless 
of ownership of the satellite.
 
In the U.S., the term 
“commercial” is applied to private sector satellites.  Despite 
the differences, “commercial” satellites share the common 
characteristic of offering images and other data for sale 
on an open market.  In the case of American commercial 
satellites, this capability is the result of the Land Remote 
Sensing Policy Act of 1992.  The Act declared the United 
States’ support of “continuous collection and utilization of 
land remote sensing data from space” in the belief that such 
data are of “major benefit in studying and understanding 
human impacts on the global environment, in managing the 
Earth’s natural resources, in carrying out national Security 
functions, and in planning and conducting many other 
activities of scientific, economic, and social importance.” 
To this end, it established procedures for licensing private 
remote sensing companies. 
In 1994, Lockheed was granted one of the first licenses from 
the U.S. Department of Commerce for commercial satellite 
high-resolution imagery. In October 1995, Space Imaging, 
a partnering company with Lockheed, launched the Ikonos 
satellite in September 1999.  On January 1, 2000, Ikonos’ 
1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral imagery 
went on the market. It was the world’s first commercial, 
high-resolution remote sensing satellite.  Hundreds more 
satellites have followed.  
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Table 2 Several examples of Satellites Offering Data on the International Market
Source: Assembled by Author
Name Launch Date Spatial Resolution Temporal  Resolution Country of Origin
RADARSAT-1 November 4, 1995 Variablea 24 days Canada
IRS-1C December 28, 1995 6 meter panchromatic 24 days India
EarlyBird-1 December 24, 1997 3 meter panchromatic
15 meter multispectral
N/A USA
Ikonos September 24, 1999 82 cm panchromatic
3.2 meter multispectral
3 days USA
EROS-A December 5, 2000 1.8 meter N/A Israel
QuickBird October 18, 2001 60 cm panchromatic
2.4 meter multispectral
1 – 3.5 days USA
Spot 5 May 4, 2002 5 meter panchromatic 
10 meter multispectral
2 – 3 days France
OrbView-3 June 2003 1 meter panchromatic
4 meter multispectral
< 3 days USA
Carosat-1 May 5, 2005 2.5 meter panchromatic 5 days India
EROS-B April 25, 2006 70 cm N/A Israel
Cartosat-2 January 10, 2007 < 1 meter 4 days India
Cosmo SkyMed-1 June 8, 2007 SARb Few hours in constellation Italy
TerraSar-X June 15, 2007 Variable, to 1 meter
SAR
2.5 days Germany
WorldView-1 September 18, 2007 .5 meter panchromatic 1.7 days USA
Cosmo SkyMed-2 December 9, 2007 SAR Few hours in constellation Italy
RADARSAT-2 December 14, 2007 Variable to 1 meter SARc N/A Canada
Cartosat-2A April 28, 2008 < 1 meter panchromatic 4 days India
GeoEye-1 September 6, 2008 0.41 meter panchromatic 
1.65 meter multispectrald
< 3 days USA
Cosmo SkyMed-3 October 25, 2008 SAR Few hours in constellation Italy
Table 1
Source: Landsat—A Global Land-Imaging Mission, United States Geological Survey
Satellite Launch Decommissioned Sensors
Landsat 1 July 23, 1972 January 6, 1978 MSS/RBV
Landsat 2 January 22, 1975 July 27, 1983 MSS/RBV
Landsat 3 March 5, 1978 September 7, 1983 MSS/RBV
Landsat 4 July 16, 1982 June 15, 2001 MSS/TM
Landsat 5 March 1, 1984 2013 MSS/TM
Landsat 6 October 5, 1993 Failed ETM
Landsat 7 April 15, 1999 Operational ETM+
Landsat 8 February 11, 2013 Operational OLI/TIRS
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WorldView-2 October 8, 2009 46 cm panchromatic
1.84 meters Multispectral: 
1.1 days USA
TanDEM-X June 21, 2010 Variablee Germany
Cartosat-2B July 12, 2010 < 1 meter panchromatic 4 days India
Cosmo SkyMed-4 November 6, 2010 SAR Few hours in constellation Italy
NigeriaSat-2 August 17, 2011 2.5 meter panchromatic
5 meter multispectral
N/A Nigeria
WorldView-3 Scheduled to launch 
on August 13, 2014
31 cm panchromatic 
1.24 meter multispectral 
3.7 meter short wave infrared 
30 meter CAVISf
< 1 day USA
Spot 6 September 9, 2012 Panchromatic - 1.5 meter
Multispectral – 6 meters 
(B,G,R,NIR)
1 day France
Spot 7 June 30, 2014 Panchromatic 1.5m
Multispectral - 6.0m 
(B,G,R,NIR)
1 day France
Pleiades-1A December 16, 2011 Panchromatic 
.5 meter
2-meter multispectral
< dayg France
Pleiades-1B December 2, 2012 Panchromatic .5 meter
2-meter multispectral
< day France
Regarding the three key metrics used in this study, one 
can see a steady advance in the technical capabilities of 
commercial satellites
By 2014, it had become apparent that the U.S. remote 
sensing industry could not compete with emerging foreign 
competition without a change in the resolution limits 
established by the Department of Commerce.  In June 
2014, a fifty-centimeter spatial resolution limitation was 
lifted.  From early 2015, the limit would be reduced to 30 
centimeters. That change applied immediately to GeoEye-1 
and WorldView-2, which have the technical capacity to 
take panchromatic images at resolutions of 41 and 46 
centimeters, respectively.  Both of these satellites are owned 
and operated by DigitalGlobe, an American company. 
In August 2014, DigitalGlobe launched its WorldView-3 
satellite, which has a thirty-one-centimeter resolution in 
the panchromatic range and is capable of collecting up to 
680,000 square km per day.38
Spatial resolution alone may not matter as much as other 
technical characteristics.  What is analytically possible with 
thirty-centimeter resolution imagery may not outweigh 
what one can be accomplished with a one-meter spatial 
resolution satellite with a high temporal resolution.  In 
other words, “good enough” one-meter spatial resolution 
38 “U.S. Department of Commerce Relaxes Resolution Restrictions DigitalGlobe 
Extends Lead in Image Quality,” June 11, 2014. http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/us-department-commerce-relaxes-resolution-restrictions-
digitalglobe-extends-lead-image-nyse-dgi-1919482.htm
a Radarsat-1 had synthetic aperture radar (SAR).  Rather than “passively” collect reflected solar energy from the earth’s surface as an optical sensor satellite does, SAR trans-
mits microwave energy to the surface and then collects its reflected energy.  This allows radar-based satellite sensors to collect data day or night and with any atmospheric 
condition.  Radarsat-1’s resolution was variable, with seven beam modes, each offering a different image resolution. The modes include: Fine with a resolution of 10 meters; 
Standard with a resolution of 30 meters; and ScanSAR with a resolution of 100 meters. This is a standard feature of radar-based sensors.
b COSMO-SkyMed is a constellation of four satellites (COSMO 1 – 4) with high-resolution SAR.  It is possible to integrate the system with the optical satellites of the French 
Pléiades high-resolution optical constellation.
c http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/pdf/radarsat2_201004_e.pdf
d A change in orbit in 2013 changed it from 41 to 46 cm panchromatic.
e “The first of the two, TerraSAR-X, has been operating since 2007. Three years on, it has been joined by its twin satellite, TanDEM-X. Flying in close formation only a few 
hundred meters apart, the two satellites are imaging the terrain below them simultaneously, from different angles. These images are processed into accurate elevation maps 
with a 12-metre resolution and a vertical accuracy better than 2 meters.” http://www.dlr.de/eo/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-5727/10086_read-21046/.
f  Clouds, Aerosols, Vapors, Ice, and Snow
g  The Pléiades satellites are the high-resolution optical imaging component of the French-Italian Orfeo system.  The Pléiades and Cosmo SkyMed systems work cooperatively.
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Figure 5
Source: Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment 2014, Spaceworks
images that are updated rapidly can be more important to 
understanding a situation, especially in quickly evolving 
crises.  Pleiades-1A and 1B and Cosmo SkyMed satellites 
operate as a constellation of compatible sensors.  Yet 
constellations of satellites are expensive.  Reaching back 
to Keyhole and other government satellites, conventional 
imaging satellites are designed for government needs, with 
each one costing about $800 million and their sizes and 
weights (about two tons) making them expensive to launch. 
A different model began to emerge in 2014.  Companies 
using off-the-shelf components and open-source software 
began to build satellites weighing only about 200 pounds. So-
called CubeSats, measuring about 30 x 10 x 10 centimeters 
or less, were the inspiration of this new generation of remote 
sensing satellites.  Their simplified manufacturing process 
and reduced weight means they are less expensive to build 
and put into orbit.  Ninety-two CubeSats were launched 
in all of 2013.39 By the first half of 2014, 122 satellites with 
masses between one and fifty kilograms (2.5 - 110 pounds) 
had been launched. By comparison, 92 CubeSats were 
launches in all of 2013. Most of the growth in CubeSats is 
found in the remote sensing sector.
Analysts forecasts anticipate that fifty-two percent of 
launches between 2014 and 2016 will be devoted to remote 
39  Jeff Foust, “The Commercial Remote Sensing Boom,” The Space Review, June 
16, 2014. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2534/1.
sensing CubeSats, whereas only twelve percent were used 
for remote sensing between 2009 and 2013.40 
There are at least four firms pursuing the development of 
large constellations of remote sensing CubeSats.  Skybox, 
now owned by Google, is probably in the strongest position 
to succeed.  In November 2013, Skybox launched SkySat-1. 
One month later, it revealed its first images, followed quickly 
by an unveiling of the first video taken by a commercial 
satellite.  The videos allow for clear tracking of automobiles 
and other vehicles—even airplanes flying across the sky far 
below the satellite.  Eventually, the company hopes to have a 
constellation of twenty-four satellites in orbit. 
Planet Labs, another CubeSat company, is pursuing the 
deployment of over one hundred medium-resolution 
remote sensing satellites.  Its first “flock” of twenty-
eight satellites was delivered to and then deployed by the 
International Space Station in January 2014.  Planet Labs 
plans to launch a total of 131 satellites by mid-2015.41  With 
that many almost identical satellites in orbit, one filling in 
for another in a synchronized orbital rotation, temporal 
40 “SkySat-1 Captures First High-Resolution, HD Video of Earth from Space,” 
Skybox, December 27, 2013. Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment 2014, 
Spaceworks. http://www.sei.aero/eng/papers/uploads/archive/SpaceWorks_
Nano_Microsatellite_Market_Assessment_January_2014.pdf
41 Richard Taylor, “Mini-satellites Send High-definition Views of Earth,” “Mini-
satellites send high-definition views of Earth”, BBC, 15 May 2014. Retrieved 
on 16 May 2014.
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resolution will be measured in hours at most.42  And of 
course the Pléiades and Cosmo SkyMed systems already 
work cooperatively to produce high-resolution radar and 
optical data with temporal resolution measured by hours.  
Another example of constellations lowering the temporal 
resolution of remote sensing is the Disaster Monitoring 
Constellation (DMC). DMC consists of satellites 
constructed by Surrey Satellite Technologies, a British firm. 
DMC International Imaging, the company that manages 
the DMC, operates the satellites for the Algerian, Nigerian, 
Turkish, British and Chinese governments.  DMC’s purpose 
is to provide emergency Earth imaging for disaster relief 
42 Jeff Foust, “The Commercial Remote Sensing Boom,” The Space Review, June 
16, 2014. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2534/1.
under the International Charter for Space and Major 
Disasters. The International Charter on Space and Major 
Disasters provides for the charitable acquisition of and 
transmission of remote sensing data to relief organizations 
in the event of major disasters.43
These are some of the major developments in commercial 
remote sensing since mostly 2000.  The chief attribute of the 
commercial satellites may not be spatial resolution.  It really 
depends on the purpose of the image.  “Good enough” 
one-meter resolution that can be updated in hours may 
be the more important attribute.  And of course geospatial 
data are important, too.  How might satellite data affect the 
regulation of violence in areas of limited statehood?
43 www.disasterscharter.org
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The principal objective of this paper is to consider the 
possible role of remote sensing satellites and geospatial 
data in areas of limited statehood.  Governance refers to 
“the various institutionalized modes of social coordination 
to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or 
to provide collective goods.”44 Gregor Walter-Drop and 
I have focused on the affordances or efficiencies created 
by information and communication technology (ICT) 
in the provisioning of collective goods, either by states 
or by alternative governance modalities, such as NGOs 
and community-based organizations.  Similarly, Krasner 
and Risse have recently highlighted the provisioning of 
collective goods by external actors.45  Less attention has 
been given to the possible roles of ICT in the enforcement of 
binding rules.  There is, of course, a great deal of academic 
and popular attention paid to the use of ICT by states for 
surveillance of domestic and foreign populations.  While 
that is an important issue, my focus here is on the use of 
ICT by nonstate actors in their effort to monitor violence 
by states.  
Put differently, I am interested in the use of remote sensing 
satellites for what might be called the “regulation of 
violence.”  How might ICT regulate the use of force by those 
who assert a responsibility and right to enforce binding 
rules, but who tend to do so poorly or with excessive and 
indiscriminant violence?  The reference to “regulation” is 
metaphorical; it is intended as a short-hand reference to 
efforts by nonstate actors to, first, identify transgressions 
of broadly recognized international norms and, second, 
to put pressure on those who are responsible for the 
transgression. The objective is to stop the transgressions, 
in part by shedding light on them and by holding 
those responsible for past transgressions accountable. 
Max Weber’s classic definition of statehood highlights the 
role of force or violence in state-based governance.  “The 
44 Risse, 2011, p. 9, emphasis added.
45 Stephen D. Krasner and Thomas Risse, External Actors, State-Building, 
and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. No. 2014.
modern state is a compulsory association that organizes 
domination.  It has been successful in seeking to monopolize 
the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination 
within a territory.”46 In an area of limited statehood, this 
ability is somehow impaired.  A weak or limited state is 
unsuccessful in its efforts to provide collective goods and 
its enforcement of binding rules with the use of force.  At 
times, the state’s legitimacy—to the degree it has it—is 
undermined by the way force is employed.  My interest 
centers on the possible role of ICT in addressing the 
maladroit use of force.
An enormous number of research questions emerge from a 
consideration of the enforcement of binding rules by various 
governance modalities or combination of modalities. 
Intuitively, one would assume that different governance 
modalities—NGOs, INGOs, firms, and clan systems—
enforce binding rules in different ways.  Identifying the 
full range of governance modalities and possible maladroit 
enforcement of binding rules would itself constitute an 
important research project. This paper cannot adequately 
cover all permutations found in security provisioning and 
enforcement of binding rules by an empirically legitimate 
use of force across all variations of governance.  Instead, it 
will focus on the digital regulation of violence in a particular 
governance space.  It can be specified by the following terms:
1. It involves violence in sectorial, spatial, temporal, or 
social areas of limited statehood.
2. State actors, such as police, military, or other state 
security personnel, or their designated surrogates, such 
as private security firms or allied militias, are the agents 
of violence.  
3. Local and global nonstate actors–transnational 
advocacy organizations–attempt to regulate these state 
actors in response to their maladroit use of force.  In 
most cases, the use of force in question constitutes a 
violation of broadly recognized international norms.
46  Weber, p. 4.  
Remote Sensing and the Regulation of Violence
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In sum, I am interested in the use of remote sensing and 
other ICTs by nonstate actors who hope to alter the behavior 
of state actors who have or are using force in such a way as 
to violate broadly recognized norms.  A part of this process 
is verification of such an abuse.
Where states are functioning or consolidated, the regulation 
of violence is often performed by official oversight offices 
or by civilian oversight commissions established by the 
state.  Technologically enabled nonstate actors’ regulation 
of violence can be seen as a functional equivalent of these 
state administrative entities.  Where the state is too weak 
to hold its own security forces to account and to monitor, 
investigate, and verify the nature of their conduct, nonstate 
actors fill at least some of the void.  Nonstate actors offer a 
functional equivalency to a consolidated state’s oversight 
functions.
Human rights monitoring groups such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch are counted among 
the nonstate actors involved in the regulation of violence. 
In a different manner, various forensic anthropology 
organizations create a factual basis for verifying human 
rights abuses by state agents.  Examples would include the 
Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team, the Guatemalan 
Forensic Anthropology Foundation, the Peruvian Forensic 
Anthropology Team, and the International Commission 
on Missing Persons, an intergovernmental organization 
established by several states to investigate the Srebrenica 
massacre and other human rights atrocities of the Bosnian 
civil war.47  
47 Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team, http://www.eaaf.org; Guatemalan 
Forensic Anthropology Foundation, http://www.fafg.org; Peruvian Forensic 
Anthropology Team, http://cja.org/article.php?id=1153; International 
Commission on Missing Persons, http://www.ic-mp.org.
Figure 6
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project
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DNA matching in the identification of human mortal 
remains offers one example of nonstate actor regulation of 
violence.  In the Balkans, Guatemala, and Peru, among other 
locations, nonstate, NGO-coalitions have used advances in 
DNA analysis (an information technology in the sense that 
the human genome is mapped only with the assistance of 
powerful, high-speed computers).  Once the remains have 
been positively identified, the evidence becomes the basis 
for various sorts of criminal prosecutions (which is in 
itself an interesting aspect of the regulation of violence), as 
discussed by Kathryn Sikkink.48
Another example of the use of ICTs for the regulation 
of violence is found in groups that use data from high-
resolution remote sensing satellites that are owned and 
48 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are 
Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).
operated by commercial firms.  Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, the Institute for Science and 
International Security, and the Satellite Sentinel Project all 
offer examples of NGOs using remote sensing geospatial 
data in their advocacy work.49  
Remote sensing and GIS are used to monitor compliance 
with broadly shared international norms in East Africa. 
DigitalGlobe, a remote sensing information company, 
and Enough, a human rights advocacy organization, have 
49 Remote Sensing for Human Rights, Amnesty International. http://www.
amnestyusa.org/research/science-for-human-rights/remote-sensing-for-
human-rights; North Kivu Satellite Imagery, Human Rights Watch, http://
www.hrw.org/node/86034; Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights 
Project,” American Association for the Advancement of Science. http://
www.aaas.org/program/geospatial-technologies-and-human-rights-project; 
Institute for Science and International Security, http://www.isis-online.org; 
Satellite Sentinel Project, http://www.satsentinel.org/reports-and-imagery.
Figure 7
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project
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partnered to create the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP).  It 
uses DigitalGlobe’s satellite imagery to monitor conflict in 
the South Sudan.  
In an effort to avoid confrontations, Sudan and South 
Sudan agreed in September 2012 to create a 12.5-mile (20 
kilometer) demilitarized zone along their shared border. 
The agreement required both sides to remove military 
forces and equipment from the buffer zone and establish a 
verification mechanism.  Although both countries agreed to 
implement the agreement in March 2013, SSP determined 
that both countries remained out of compliance as late as 
June 2013. Using DigitalGlobe satellite imagery acquired in 
May and June 2013, several violations were evident:
Satellite imagery supports the conclusion that the 
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army, or SPLA, maintain 
military installations or checkpoints in at least nine 
locations along the border, while the Sudan Armed 
Forces, SAF, have positions in at least five locations 
along the border, some with visible tanks and heavy 
artillery.50 
Images captured on February 13, 2012, May 6, 2013, and 
June 3, 2013 (see Figure 6) show a Sudanese infantry 
company, including howitzers, tanks, and several tents that 
presumably cover more tanks, all in the demilitarized zone. 
Figure 7 identifies elements of an SPLA (South Sudan) 
infantry unit also found in the demilitarized zone.  Figure 
8 identifies something as small as a platoon-size force in 
violation of the agreement.  
50 Troops in the Demilitarized Zone: Confirmation of Violations by Sudan 
and South Sudan, The Satellite Sentinel Project, (2013), p. 1. http://www.
enoughproject.org/files/Troops-in-the-Demilitarized-Zone.pdf 
Figure 8
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project
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In another example, SSP has relied on DigitalGlobe imagery 
to monitor and document harm done to civilians caught in 
battles between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the rebel 
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).51  The burning of several 
villages and repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilian 
areas in Abu Kershola are clearly evident in the images. 
Figure 9 notes the extensive presence of bomb craters 
scattered about Abu Kershola.
Figure 10, another image taken on April 22, 2013, shows the 
charred remains of the village of Ad Dandour.
Less dramatic examples of monitoring and evaluation 
initiatives using commercial imagery can be offered as 
well.  For example, evaluation of present vegetation cover 
51 Civilians Caught in the Crossfire: The Bombing of Abu Kershola and Burning of 
Ad Dandour, Satellite Sentinel Project 
and health in comparison with past imagery – factoring in 
other environmental variables such as ocean temperatures 
– is used to predict drought conditions in East Africa.52 
Finally, remote sensing data and GIS rest in the background 
of all “crisis mapping” initiatives. Examples include the first 
deployment of the Ushahidi open-source GIS platform 
used to monitor post-election violence during the 2007-
08 Kenyan elections.  Since its launch, anywhere in the 
world where Ushahidi has been used to crowdsource geo-
52 Tsegaye Tadesses, Getachew Berhan Demisse, Ben Zaitchik, and Tufa 
Dinku, “Satellite-based Hybrid Drought Monitoring Tool for Prediction 
of Vegitation Condition in East Africa: A Case Study for Ethiopia,” Water 
Resource Research, Vol 50, Issue 3, March 2014, pp. 2176-2190; Markus 
Enenkel, Linda See, Rogerio Bonifacio, Vijendra Boken, Nathaniel Chaney, 
Patrick Vinck, Liangzhi You, Emanuel Dutra, Martha Anderson, “Drought 
and Food Security – Improving Decision-Support via New Technologies 
and Innovative Collaboration,” Global Food Security, (2014), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.gfs.2014.08.005. 
Figure 9
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project
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referenced spots, the same geospatial awareness is relied 
upon.
These are just a few examples of the use of remote sensing in 
the regulation of violence in areas of limited statehood.  How 
might these developments be articulated in the theoretical 
literature of political science? It has already been noted that 
the limited statehood literature frames the consideration 
of conditions leading to the use of indiscriminate, 
undisciplined violence by the security forces responsible for 
the provisioning of individual and collective security.  To 
account for the use of remote sensing by nonstate actors 
requires another theoretical anchor.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s “boomerang 
model” of transnational advocacy offers a way to understand 
this process. According to the boomerang model, 
NGOs in a country experiencing violations of broadly 
recognized international norms make appeals to the NGOs, 
foundations, and state institutions of another country in 
an attempt to convince them put pressure on the state that 
is in violation of norms.  Together, transnational NGOs, 
international organizations, and some state institutional 
coalitions create what Keck and Sikkink call Transnational 
Advocacy Networks (TANs). Verification processes of the 
alleged violations are an important part of the process.53  At 
the heart of TAN work is a dense exchange of information 
and services.  “What is novel in these networks is the 
ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize 
information strategically to help create new issues and 
categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over 
much more powerful organizations and governments.”54 
53 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Kindle Locations 134-139). Cornell 
University Press. Kindle Edition. Emphasis added.
54 Keck and Sikkink, Kindle Locations 159-160.
Figure 10
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project
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Lacking more traditional avenues of success in political 
influence, such as money and force, they “must use the 
power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the 
information and value contexts within which states make 
policies.”55 
TANs use commercial remote sensing satellite data to “map” 
the range of possible unregulated state violence.  Mapping is 
the process of making illegible terrain clear to an outsider. 
Maps, as James Scott notes, are more than just maps.  When 
allied with state power, “maps enable much of the reality 
they depicted to be remade.”56  State simplifications of 
the kind examined in this paper are designed to provide 
authorities with a schematic view of their society, a view 
Scott assumes is not afforded to those outside the state.57 
In this respect, Scott is wrong.  States no longer enjoy a 
monopoly on the synoptic view of earth from space.  From 
the vantage point of space, a précis of the entire earth is 
offered the user of commercial remote sensing satellite data. 
With private satellite technology, legibility as Scott describes 
it has been decoupled from the state.  Nonstate actors, 
from corporations to nongovernmental organizations 
and community groups now have access to the means of 
ordering a disorderly world on their own terms.  
55 Keck and Sikkink, Kindle Locations 390-391.
56 Scott, p. 3, Kindle
57 Scott, p. 79 Kindle
